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How the Law is Dealing with Indigenous Vulnerability to Victimization

In the words of the Alberta Court of Appeal, “there is clear and overwhelming evidence that, when it comes to protecting Aboriginal women from violence and discrimination, more needs to be done.”[1] Indigenous women are almost three times more likely to experience violent victimization than non-Indigenous women, and their homicide rate is six times higher. This crisis prompted calls for a victim’s status as an Indigenous woman to be a primary consideration in sentencing: The sad fact is that Aboriginal women are disproportionately affected by domestic violence and violence in general and this reality should inform the sentencing process if there is to be any hope of achieving the fundamental purpose of sentencing and meeting the objectives set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code , which include denunciation and deterrence.[2] In 2019, Parliament responded by amending the Criminal Code to mandate that sentencing judges recognize and account for the heightened vulnerability ...

New Jordan Law from the SCC: Sentencing Delay Under section 11(b) of the Charter

The Criminal Code requires that sentencing must take place “as soon as practicable” after guilt is found (section 720, Criminal Code); however, until recently, the constitutional boundaries governing the length of the post-verdict sentencing process remained open. In R. v. Jordan , the Supreme Court of Canada articulated a framework for determining whether the length of a criminal trial infringes s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , establishing presumptive ceilings of 18 months in provincial courts and 30 months in superior courts. However, the Jordan ceilings do not govern the entire lifecycle of a criminal proceeding; they apply strictly to the period between the laying of the charge and the actual or anticipated end of evidence and argument at trial. Up to now, the Court had not imposed presumptive ceilings for delays at any other stage. That changed with the Court's ruling in R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30 (CanLII) , which addressed how to assess the rea...

The “state of mind exception” to the hearsay rule

Pursuant to the traditional, fixed, “state of mind exception” to the hearsay rule exception, an out-of-court statement made by a person may be admitted if it discloses their relevant, present existing state of mind, and the statement was made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion.  FN1. Evidence satisfying this exception will be  prima facie  admissible, but only “in order to demonstrate the intentions or state of mind of the declarant at the time the statement was made”. FN2. Statements admitted pursuant to this exception cannot be used to establish the past acts or events that the statements describe. FN3 The hearsay exception in action R. v. Griffin provides an example of the hearsay exception in action. In that case, the sole issue at trial was the identity of P’s killer.   P was in hiding in the weeks leading up to his murder and during this time stated to his girlfriend, “If anything happens to me it’s your cousin’s family.” ...

When the Sentencing Judge Exceeds the Crown’s Position on Sentence

 It is an error in principle for a sentencing judge to fail to provide notice and an opportunity for further submissions when they are considering exceeding the Crown’s position on sentence.  FN1 Where the sentencing judge fails to provide notice and/or an opportunity for further submissions, there are three types of errors in principle that would warrant intervention by the appellate court:   1. The accused would have provided additional information to the sentencing judge if given notice that he thought the Crown’s recommendation was too low and this additional information would have impacted sentence; 2.    The sentencing judge provided unclear or insufficient reasons explaining the imposition of the harsher sentence; 3. The sentencing judge gave erroneous reasons for the harsher sentence. (Standing alone, however, flawed reasoning will not be enough; the appellant must also satisfy the court that this reasoning impacted the sentence). FN2    ...

Restricting a Young Person’s Online Access to Pornography

There is a fantastic online safety ad created by the New Zealand government as part of its public awareness campaign, Keep It Real Online . The 2020 ad has rightly gone viral and is one of my all-time favourites. In it two adult film actors (played by Cassandra Woodhouse and Paris Theodosiou) arrive naked at the front door of a young teenager’s house and tell his stunned mother “Hiya …We just came over because your 14-year-old son has been watching us…online… . Online we just get to it, we never really talk about consent. …We usually perform for adults but your son’s just a kid.” The dumbfounded son emerges from inside the house holding his laptop. His shocked mother (hair wrapped in a towel) reels from the disclosure that her son has been accessing pornography from his computer, and from the fact that two nude people have come to her door to explain—with hilarious nonchalance—that the online pornographic scenarios they are part of are not necessarily representative of “how relationshi...