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Showing posts from April, 2019

Absconding Accused during Trial

When an Accused may be absent from his/her trial Section 650 of the Criminal Code requires an accused to be present during his trial except in three situations: (1) when an accused so disrupts or interferes with the proceedings he must be removed; (2) the trial court permits the accused to be absent; or (3) during a fitness hearing where allowing the accused to remain in the courtroom has the potential for causing an adverse affect upon the accused's mental condition. Section 475 of the Code deals with what may be done when an accused "a bsconds during the course of his trial." [ Code s. 475(1)].   Under this provision, the Court may be called upon to determine at the outset whether the trial has commenced.   Having found that the trial has commenced, the Court must determine whether there has been an abscondence. Absconds It is common ground that the meaning of A absconding" for the purpose of s. 475 is as defined by Martin J.A. in

When is a Judge Bound to Her/His Pre-trial Sentencing Position?

Where, in a pre-trial hearing, the sentencing judge agrees to impose a particular sentence on an accused in exchange for a guilty plea, and the accused enters a guilty plea relying on the judge’s sentencing position at the pre-trial hearing, the appearance of fairness requires that the judge impose the sentence he/she committed to in the pre-trial hearing and upon which the accused relied. R. v. O’Quinn (2001), 2002 CanLII 44942 (ON CA). So as to avoid misunderstandings as to the appropriate sentence, where the judge has agreed to impose a particular sentence (including a sentence within a particular range), counsel should place the essence of the pre-trial discussions on the record at the time the guilty plea is entered. R. v. O’Quinn (2001), 2002 CanLII 44942 (ON CA), at para. 14; See also R. v. Scott , 2011 ONCA 365 (CanLII). However, a sentencing judge is entitled to change his/her mind as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence if additional relevant facts

R. v. Mills: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Protection of Children

Children are especially vulnerable to sexual crimes and, without question, the Internet allows for greater opportunities to sexually exploit them. Protecting children from becoming victims of sexual offences is vital in a free and democratic society, and that need can inform the scope of one's reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter.  Most relationships between adults and children are worthy of s. 8’s protection, including, but in no way limited to, those with family, friends, professionals, or religious advisors. R. v. Mills , 2019 SCC 22, at paras. 23, 24 [plurality opinion; Moldaver J, concurring]. However, an adult does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in online communications between himself and a person he believes to be child, where the person he believes to be a child is effectively a stranger to him, and where police are aware of this. Ibid. , at para. 30.  Thus, police did not need to obtain a warrant to capture the