R. v. Mills: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Protection of Children


Children are especially vulnerable to sexual crimes and, without question, the Internet allows for greater opportunities to sexually exploit them.

Protecting children from becoming victims of sexual offences is vital in a free and democratic society, and that need can inform the scope of one's reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter. 

Most relationships between adults and children are worthy of s. 8’s protection, including, but in no way limited to, those with family, friends, professionals, or religious advisors.

R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22, at paras. 23, 24 [plurality opinion; Moldaver J, concurring].

However, an adult does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in online communications between himself and a person he believes to be child, where the person he believes to be a child is effectively a stranger to him, and where police are aware of this.


Ibid., at para. 30. 


Thus, police did not need to obtain a warrant to capture the online communications sent to them by Mills, who thought he was communicating with a child. 



FN: In brief, the facts on appeal in R. v. Mills were as follows:  A police officer posed online as a 14‑year‑old girl named Leann, with the intent of catching Internet child lurers. Using Facebook and Hotmail, the appellant sent “Leann” sexually explicit messages and arranged a meeting in a park, where he was arrested and charged with child luring. Without having obtained prior judicial authorization, the police used screen capture software to create a record of the online communications as evidence for trial.  The Court was required to consider whether the investigative technique employed by the undercover police officer amounted to a search or seizure of the appellant’s online communications, within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter.




Stuart O’Connell, O’Connell Law Group. (All rights reserved to author)


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