The Admissibility of Non-Expert Opinion Evidence
As a general rule, opinion evidence is not admissible;
witnesses testify as to the facts which they perceived, not as to the
inferences – that is, the opinions -- that they drew from their perceptions:
Graat v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R.
There is, however, an exception for witnesses duly
qualified to express an expert’s opinion:
R. v. Abbey, 1982 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24.
The opinion evidence of
non‑expert
witnesses is generally inadmissible. In R.
v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275at para. 49, Justice Major
summarized this long-standing exclusionary rule:
A
basic tenet of our law is that the usual witness may not give opinion evidence,
but testify only to facts within his knowledge, observation and experience.
This is a commendable principle since it
is the task of the fact finder, whether a jury or judge alone, to decide what
secondary inferences are to be drawn from the facts proved.
There is an exception to
this rule: the compendious statement of facts exception.
The modern approach to
the compendious facts exception was set out by Mr. Justice Dickson in R. v. Graat, 1982 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819. Dickson J.
began by noting the tenuous distinction between fact and opinion evidence:
Except
for the sake of convenience there is little, if any, virtue, in any distinction
resting on the tenuous, and frequently false, antithesis between fact and
opinion. The line between “fact” and “opinion” is not clear…
I
can see no reason in principle or in common sense why a lay witness should not
be permitted to testify in the form of an opinion if, by doing so, he is able
more accurately to express the facts he perceived.
Additionally,
the Supreme Court of Canada drew a series of conclusions on the admissibility
of lay opinion evidence and provided a non-exhaustive list of recognized
subjects upon which lay witnesses are allowed to express opinions:
i.
the
identification of handwriting, persons and things;
ii.
apparent age;
iii.
the bodily plight
or condition of a person, including death and illness;
iv.
the emotional
state of a person – e.g. whether distressed, angry, aggressive, affectionate or
depressed;
v.
the condition of
things – e.g. worn, shabby, used or new;
vi.
certain questions
of value; and
vii.
estimates of
speed and distance.
In R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, at 836.
Lay Opinion and Demeanour Evidence
In R.
v. H.B, 2016 ONCA 953, the appellant challenged the admissibility of demeanour
evidence on the bases that 1. Such evidence was hearsay (see my last blog
entry, Is Demeanour Evidence Hearsay?)
and 2. It constituted opinion evidence of a non-expert witness (that is, the
opinion of a police officer as to the observable emotional state of a person
that was not called as a witness at trial).
The Court
of Appeal for Ontario determined that because the demeanour evidence
fell squarely within item
(iv) of the Graat list—evidence of
“the emotional state of a person – e.g. whether [a person was]
distressed, angry, aggressive, affectionate or depressed”—the police officer’s opinion
evidence was admissible.
R. v. H.B., 2016 ONCA 953 at para 75
Demeanour Evidence: Does the Demeanour Evidence Relate to the Accused or
a Non-Accused?
In R. v. H.B.,
the Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that demeanour evidence generally
ought not to be admissible, noting that the case law which may support that
proposition were cases involving evidence of an accused person’s demeanour, and
not what
was in question in this case, demeanour evidence of a non-accused
person.
R. v. H.B., 2016 ONCA 953 at para 73.
Comments
Post a Comment