Expert Witnesses: the Duty to Provide Fair, Non-partisan, and Objective Assistance
Qualifying the Expert Witness
For expert evidence to be
admissible the expert must be
properly qualified. The party who tenders the witness as an
expert is required to demonstrate that the witness has acquired a special
knowledge of a particular topic by formal study, practical experience, or both,
which extends beyond that of the trier of fact. The competence of the witness
to give expert evidence, or to be qualified as an expert, does not depend on
how the skill was acquired, only that it has been gained.
Justice
Watt, Manual of Criminal Evidence,
2013 at pg. 428.
Deficiencies in an
expert’s opinion go to weight, not admissibility.
R. v. Marquard, 1993 CanLII 37 (SCC) at pg. 224.
Additionally, in order for
the expert to be properly qualified, the expert must be
willing and able to fulfil the expert's duty to the court to provide evidence
that is:
i. Impartial,
ii. Independent, and
` iii. Unbiased.
Nothing less than
scrupulous vigilance from trial judges is required when dealing with the
admissibility of expert opinion evidence.
R. v.
Livingston, 2017 ONCJ 645 (CanLII), at para. 36; see also White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015
SCC 23 (CanLII), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182, at
para. 12: “We are now all too aware
that an expert’s lack of independence and impartiality can result in egregious
miscarriages of justice.”
The court is required to
consider the particular circumstances of the proposed expert and the substance
of his/her proposed evidence.
The test is whether the
relationship or interest results in the expert being unable or unwilling to
carry out his or her primary duty to the court to provide fair, non-partisan
and objective assistance.
White Burgess, at
para. 50.
Given this test, the mere
fact that the witness is a police officer, without more, will not result in
exclusion.
For
instance, R. v. T.A., 2015 ONCJ 624
(CanLII), at para. 20.
However, the nature and
level of the proposed expert’s participation in the police investigation are
factors which may give rise to a realistic concern of bias.
See
R. v. Livingston, 2017 ONCJ 645
(CanLII).
Bias in its Various Guises
In R. v. France, [2017] (SCJ), at para.
17 Malloy J. refers to a 2009 article by Professor David Paciocco (now
Justice Paciocco of the Court of Appeal for Ontario) that discusses how expert
bias can come in many forms:
Professor Paciocco stresses the importance of the expert
maintaining an "open mind to a broad range of possibilities" and
notes that bias can often be unconscious. He refers to a number of forms of
bias: lack of independence (because of a connection to the party calling the
expert); "adversarial" or "selection" bias (where the
witness has been selected to fit the needs of the litigant); "association
bias" (the natural bias to do something serviceable for those who employ
or remunerate you); professional credibility bias (where an expert has a
professional interest in maintaining their own credibility after having taken a
position); "noble cause distortion" (the belief that a particular
outcome is the right one to achieve); and, a related form of bias,
"confirmation bias" (the phenomenon that when a person is attracted
to a particular outcome, there is a tendency to search for evidence that
supports the desired conclusion or to interpret the evidence in a way that
supports it). Confirmation bias was a particular problem identified in the
Goudge Report as Dr. Smith and other pathologists and coroners at the time
approached their investigations with a "think dirty" policy, an
approach "inspired by the noble cause of redressing the long history of
inaction in protecting abused children," and designed to "help ferret
it out and address it." Unfortunately, as commented on by the Goudge
Report and by Professor Paciocco, such an approach raises a serious risk of
confirmation bias.
The proponent of the evidence has the burden of
establishing its admissibility
A person who opposes the admission of the
evidence on the basis of bias has the burden of establishing a "realistic
concern" that the witness is unwilling or unable to comply with the duty
and the proffering party must rebut this concern on a balance of probabilities
to satisfy the test for admissibility.
White
Burgess,
at para. 48.
Stuart
O’Connell, O’Connell Law Group, www.leadersinlaw.ca
Comments
Post a Comment