Delayed Access to Counsel
Section 10(b) of the Charter
guarantees to anyone arrested or detained the right “to retain and instruct
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right”.
Section 10(b) obliges the
police to advise a detained person of the right to speak with counsel without
delay and, if the detained person exercises that right, the police must
immediately provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to speak to
counsel.
The section 10(b) Charter right
to consult counsel without delay exists because those who are arrested or
detained are apt to require immediate legal
advice that they cannot access without help, because of their detention.
R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 173, at p. 191;
R v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, at para. 41.
The right to counsel is a lifeline for detained
persons. Through that lifeline, detained persons obtain, not only legal advice
and guidance about the procedures to which they will be subjected, but also the
sense that they are not entirely at the mercy of the police while detained. The
psychological value of access to counsel without delay should not be
underestimated.
R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745,
143 O.R. (3) 135, at para. 45.
An Applicant
Asserting a 10(b) Breach is not Required to give Evidence as to why he Requires
his Right to be Respected
A detainee
is not required to offer direct evidence about why he requires access to
counsel without delay.
R. v. Noel,
2019 ONCA 860, at para. 27.
The Impact of Delayed Access to Counsel
In assessing the impact of such breaches under the Grant
framework for section 24(2) of the Charter, it is not appropriate for
courts to plumb the content and significance of the conversations a detainee
would have had, if his right to consult counsel without delay had been
respected. The impact of the loss of the
right to consult counsel without delay can be evaluated based on the interests
it is meant to protect along with the length of the delay.
R. v. Noel,
2019 ONCA 860, at para. 27.
The loss of this right is in no way neutralized
because the right to consult counsel is delayed, as opposed to denied. Nor is
the impact of delayed access to counsel neutralized where an accused fails to
demonstrate that the delay caused them to be unable to have a late but
meaningful conversation with counsel.
Noel,
at para. 22.
The Seriousness of Delayed Access
to Counsel
The seriousness of a section
10(b) implementational breach cannot be attenuated by the fact that the police
did not commit an additional breach of the accused’s rights.
See, for instance R. v.
Noel, 2019 ONCA 860: the
trial judge erred in concluding that the seriousness of the section 10
breach had been attenuated because police complied with their obligation to
hold off questioning the arrestee until after contact with counsel had been
facilitated. It would have been yet another s. 10(b) breach had the police attempted to use the arrestee as a source of
self-incriminating evidence before he had a reasonable opportunity to speak to
counsel.
Stuart O’Connell,
O’Connell Law Group (All rights reserved to author.)
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