Police Powers: Random Vehicle Stops


Random Vehicle Stops under the HTA

The Highway Traffic Act of Ontario (specifically, section 216(1)) of the Act) allows a police officer to stop a motor vehicle even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of an offence having been committed providing it is done for the purpose of general traffic regulation such as checking for a valid driver’s license and insurance, mechanical fitness of the vehicle and the sobriety of the driver.

In short, there is a statutory basis for police to stop vehicles for the purpose of highway regulation and safety, even where the stops are random.

Brown v. Durham, at para. 21;

R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at p. 1288;

R. v. Simpson (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 492.



Equivalent legislation in Canada’s other provinces provides likewise.

See, for instance, section 201.1 of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Highway Traffic Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-3, and British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act, [RSBC 1996] Chapter 318.

Random stops pursuant to this statutory provision have been held to be arbitrary and thus violate s. 9 of the Charter (right to not be arbitrarly detained) but are nevertheless saved by s. 1 of the Charter, provided the officer’s true purposes for the arbitrary stop relate to enforcement of the Highway Traffic Act.

See for instance, Hufsky, at pp. 636‑37; R. v. Ladouceur.

Given the fragile constitutional basis for these kinds of random “check-stops”, there are strict limits on the scope of police questioning and police procedures in the course of such a stop.

R. v. Humphrey, 2011 ONSC 3024, at para. 80 (however, see Brown v. Durham: “it unnecessary to distinguish between arbitrary and non-arbitrary stops under s. 216(1) when a s. 9 claim is made.”)

For instance, s. 216(1) does not authorize more intrusive examinations of the interior of the vehicle or inquiries of any occupant directed at subjects not relevant to highway safety concerns:

Brown v. Durham, at para. 24; R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 at p. 623-24.

If the police exceed the narrow s. 1 road safety justifications for a random stop, the s. 9 breach can no longer be saved and the Charter will be violated.

The detention authorized by s. 216(1) of the H.T.A. is circumscribed by its purpose. It is limited to the roadside. It must be brief, unless other grounds are established that permit a further detention. An officer may require a driver to produce the documents drivers are legally required to have with them. To check those documents against information contained in databases accessible through the onboard computer terminal in police vehicles, an officer is entitled to detain the vehicle and its occupants while doing so:

Brown v. Durham, at para. 24.

In addition to requiring production of various documents associated with the operation of a motor vehicle, a police officer, acting under the authority of s. 216(1) of the HTA, may also make a visual examination of the interior of the vehicle to ensure their own safety during the detention:

Brown v. Durham, at para. 24; Ladouceur, at pp. 1286-1287;

R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at pp. 623-24.



However, s. 216(1) does not authorize more intrusive examinations of the interior of the vehicle or inquiries of any occupant directed at subjects not relevant to highway safety concerns:

Brown v. Durham, at para. 24; Mellenthin, at p. 623-24.

A trial judge’s finding that highway regulation or safety concerns was a purpose that animated a traffic stop is a finding of fact.

Random Stops at Common Law

The courts have also recognized that police have a power at common law (ancillary powers doctrine) to conduct random stops of vehicles.

See R. v. Dedman [the common law authority for the random stops conducted under the R.I.D.E. program--a program in which police establish checkpoints at the side of the road and pull over motorists at random to check their sobriety--can be derived from the general duties of police officers on the basis of the test laid down in R. v. Waterfield, 1985 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1963] 3 All E.R. 659]. 

It is important to note that where a person is detained by police in the course of efforts to determine whether that person is involved in a criminal activity being investigated, that detention can only be justified if the detaining officer has some articulable cause, or said in another way, reasonable grounds to suspect, the person is involved in the investigated activity. This standard includes both objective and subjective components:

R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 15, at paras. 27 and 33;

R. v. Simpson (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 500.



Stuart O'Connell, O'Connell Law Group, leadersinlaw.ca




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