Identifying a Drug in the Absence of a Certificate of Analysis

In a narcotics-related case, the Crown must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the material seized from an accused was a prohibited substance. To that end, the Crown must prove that the substance dealt with by, or in the possession of, the accused is the same substance that is alleged in the information or indictment (and prohibited by law).

R. v. Larsen, 2001 BCSC 597 (CanLII), aff’d on other grounds 2003 BCCA 18 (CanLII).

The chemical or scientific analysis of an illegal substance normally provides a court with reliable and trustworthy evidence that the substance was actually illegal according to its components. The certificate of analysis conveys just that. In practice, the certificate ends any debate about what was seized.

The danger of permitting lay identification of an allegedly illegal substance is manifest and ought not to be encouraged.

R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252 (CanLII), at para. 2.

Although it should be the rare case in which a trial judge makes a finding that a substance is a particular narcotic in the absence of a certificate of analysis, it is nevertheless open for a trial judge to make such a finding on circumstantial evidence or statements.

R. v. Douglas, 2017 ONCA 609;

See also Peter Brauti & Brian Puddington, Prosecuting and Defending Drug Offences, (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2003) at 100.



Stuart O’Connell, O’Connell Law Group, www.leadersinlaw.ca

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