The Modern Approach to Assessing the Threshold Reliability of a Hearsay Statement
The rule excluding hearsay
Hearsay evidence is presumptively
inadmissible primarily because, absent contemporaneous cross-examination of the
declarant, the party against whom the evidence is offered cannot effectively
test the reliability and veracity of the out-of-court statement.
Hearsay evidence is excluded both
to protect the integrity of the truth seeking function of the trial and to preserve
the fairness of the trial:
See Khelawon, at
paras. 48, 63; and R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517, at para. 77.
The principled exception to the rule excluding hearsay
The principled exception to the hearsay rule was
discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the cases of R. v. Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531,
R. v. Smith, 1992 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915
and R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 (CanLII), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787.
In essence, the Supreme Court of
Canada has found that hearsay evidence can be admitted if, on a balance of
probabilities, the hearsay evidence meets the twin requirements of necessity
and reliability.
Today’s blog will deal only with the
approach to assessing the reliability of a hearsay statement.
The modern approach to assessing the threshold reliability of a hearsay
statement – two lines of inquiry
The principled exception to the
rule excluding hearsay evidence recognizes that some hearsay is sufficiently reliable to warrant its
admissibility and consideration by the trier of fact even though the declarant
of the statement was not subject to cross-examination when the
statement was made. The case law identifies two lines of inquiry relevant
to the assessment of the reliability of hearsay
evidence:
(1) the presence of adequate
substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability); and
(2) sufficient circumstantial
guarantees of reliability or an inherent trustworthiness (substantive
reliability).
In addition, probative value and
prejudicial effect must be balanced at the end of the analysis in some cases.
1.
Procedural
reliability
The first line of inquiry asks
whether there are sufficient other means available to test the
reliability of the hearsay statement so as to
render unnecessary the requirement of contemporaneous cross-examination of the
declarant. For example, the availability of the declarant for meaningful
cross-examination at trial can go a long way to providing an
adequate substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant:
Khelawon, at paras. 63, 76; and R. v. Devine, 2008 SCC 36 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, at paras. 22-28.
Under this line of inquiry, the
truth of the contents of the hearsay statement is irrelevant to the reliability inquiry:
2.
Substantive reliability
The second line of inquiry looks to determine whether the circumstances in which the hearsay
statement was made provide sufficient comfort of its truth to
justify its consideration by the trier of fact despite the absence of
contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant. Records made in the
usual and ordinary course of business provide a good example of inherently
trustworthy hearsay declarations. In determining whether hearsay is sufficiently inherently trustworthy to
warrant its admission, the court may consider not only the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement but other evidence properly before the
trier of fact supporting or undermining the accuracy of the out-of-court
statement:
See Khelawon, at paras. 4, 56-63; R. v.
Blackman, 2008 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298, at para. 35; R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517
at para 80;; Devine, at para. 22; and R. v. S.S., 2008 ONCA 140 (CanLII), (2008) 232 C.C.C. (3d)
158, at paras. 24-25.
The two lines of inquiry
described above are not mutually exclusive, but are considered together in
assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence for the purposes
of determining its admissibility: see Blackman, at para. 35.
There is, however, one important
distinction between the two inquiries, as I mentioned above. If the hearsay evidence is said to be reliable because there
are other suitable substitutes for contemporaneous cross-examination, the truth
of the contents of the hearsay statement is irrelevant to the reliability inquiry:
see R. v.
Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517, at para. 77 at para. 87.
If, however, the evidence is said
to be sufficiently reliable because of the circumstances in
which it was made or the other evidence before the trier of fact, the
reliability assessment requires a consideration of the truth of the hearsay statement. The court will admit the hearsay
statement only if satisfied that the circumstances provide sufficient
confidence of the truth of the statement to justify admitting
the statement even though it will go largely, if not entirely, untested.
As explained in Couture, at para. 99:
Because there are no adequate
substitutes for testing the evidence on the facts of this case, there must be
some compelling feature about the statement that commands sufficient trust in
its truth and accuracy to warrant its admission regardless.
See R. v. Dupe, 2016
ONCA 653
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