The Misapprehension of Evidence by the Trial Judge
In
R. v. Morrisey, (1995),
97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 221, Doherty J.A. stated:
Where a
trial judge is mistaken as to the substance of material parts of the evidence
and those errors play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in a
conviction, then, in my view, the accused’s conviction is not based exclusively
on the evidence and is not a “true” verdict.
At
a later point in the same paragraph, he stated:
If an
appellant can demonstrate that the conviction depends on a misapprehension of
the evidence, then, in my view, it must follow that the appellant has not received
a fair trial, and was a victim of a miscarriage of justice. This is so, even if
the evidence, as actually adduced at trial, was capable of supporting a
conviction.
As
the Supreme Court of Canada observed after citing Morrissey in R. v. Lohrer,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, at para. 4:
Morrissey, it should be emphasized, describes a stringent
standard. The misapprehension of the evidence must go to the substance rather
than to the detail. It must be material rather than peripheral to the reasoning
of the trial judge. Once those hurdles are surmounted, there is the further
hurdle (the test is expressed as conjunctive rather than disjunctive) that the
errors identified must play an essential part not just in the narrative of the
judgment but ‘in the reasoning process resulting in conviction.’
In R. v. Marini, 2017 ONCA 46, for instance, even although the evidence adduced at trial
may have been capable of supporting the appellant’s conviction, “the errors the
trial judge made in assessing the evidence played an essential part in his
reasoning process with the result that the convictions were not “true” verdicts
in the sense of having been arrived at in accordance with the rule of law.”
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