Whether the Intoxilyzer Tests Were Taken as soon as practicable
Paragraph 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code
provides that evidence of the results of the analyses by an Intoxilyzer of
samples of breath of a defendant are proof of the concentration of alcohol in
his or her blood at the time of the alleged offence if, among other things,
each breath sample was taken "as soon as practicable after the time the
offence was committed".
In order to take advantage of
this statutory presumption the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
each of its requirements have been met. As Justice Hill held in R. v. Walker,
[2006] O.J.
No. 2679,
Compliance with the statutory
scheme must be strictly construed where the prosecution is relieved of the obligation
of adducing expert evidence on the subject.
There is no requirement that the
tests be taken as soon as possible. Nor does the provision
require an exact accounting of every moment in the chronology.
·
The provisions of s. 254(2) should not be interpreted
to require an exact accounting of every moment in the chronology.
·
The touchstone for determining whether the tests
were taken as soon as practicable is whether the police acted reasonably.
·
In deciding whether the tests
were taken as soon as practicable, the trial judge should look at the whole
chain of events bearing in mind that the Criminal Code permits an outside limit
of two hours from the time of the offence to the taking of the first test. The
"as soon as practicable" requirement must be applied with reason.
R. v. Vanderbruggen, 2006 CanLII 9039 (ON
CA), [2006]
O.J. No. 1138, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 489,
The
requirement that the samples be taken as soon as practicable means
"nothing more than that the tests should be administered within a
reasonably prompt time in the overall circumstances."
R. v. Singh, 2014 ONCA 293 (CanLII), at para. 14 [2014] [the Court of Appeal reiterating the Vanderbruggen decision].
These notes of caution by the
Court of Appeal do not, however, diminish the requirement of s. 254(2). The
analysis which trial courts are required to undertake is not one in which every
unjustified minute of delay is totted up, with the resulting sum being analyzed
to determine whether the requirement has been met. At the same time, however,
the analysis is not whether the total delay seems reasonable without analysis
of the reasons therefor. The inquiry is fact-specific. Just as the Court of
Appeal held in R. v. Quansah, 2012 ONCA 123 (CanLII), that there is
not a rule of a standard 15 minute allowable period of delay in administering
the ASD test, there is not a rule of a standard permissible period of delay in
administering the Intoxilyzer test. A fact-specific inquiry requires that
significant periods of delay be identified and the Crown be required to justify
them.
As Durno J. held in R. v.
Schouten, [2002] O.J.
No. 4777,
… each case must
be examined on its own facts. One hour and forty-six minutes could be "as
soon as practicable": R. v. Letford (2001), 2000 CanLII 17024 (ON CA), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). One
hour and thirty minutes might not be "as soon as practicable" in
another: R. v. Lightfoot, (1980), 4 M.V.R. 238 (Ont. C.A.).
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