Deportation for Serious Criminality

The immigration consequences for a criminal conviction can be extremely serious.
What constitutes “serious criminality”?
Under section 36(1)(1) of the Immigration and Refuge Protection Act, a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality whereupon he/she is convicted of
1.        a federal offence (which includes any offence in the Criminal Code or the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) punishable by a maximum term of at least 10 years’ imprisonment, or

2.      a federal offence for which a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months has been imposed.
By virtue of section 36(3) of that Act, an offence which has been prosecuted summarily (but is a hybrid offence, meaning that the Crown had the discretion to proceed by way of indictment or summarily) will be deemed to be an indictable offence.  
So, for instance, a conviction for sexual assault, with currently carries a maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment, will prima facie result in inadmissibility under s. 36(1), notwithstanding the fact that the offence was prosecuted summarily and the sentence was at the lowest end of the sentencing range for that offence.
The potentially very significant consequences which follow a conviction that rises to the level of serious criminality under the Immigration and Refuge Protection Act may be taken into account by a sentencing court. 

Sentencing courts sometimes refer to such consequences as collateral consequences, which are, as stated in R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 (CanLII), any consequence which affects the impact of the sentence on the particular offender.
Taking into Account the Collateral Consequences of a Sentence
Immigration consequences of a sentence (as with other forms of collateral consequences) for a particular offender are a relevant factor for a sentencing judge to consider. But they provide no warrant for the imposition of a sentence which is not true to the governing objectives and principles of sentencing, including the fundamental principle of proportionality (a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender). 

          R. v. Pham, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 14-16;
         R. v. Moran, 2019 ONCA 217.

Collateral consequences are not, strictly speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors, since such factors are by definition related only to the gravity of the offence or to the degree of responsibility of the offender (s. 718.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code).   
The collateral consequences of a sentence must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, consideration of collateral immigration consequences must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.

        R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 (CanLII), at paras 11, 14, 16; 
       See R. v. McKenzie, 2017 ONCA, at para 26.
What is important is that, whatever mode of analysis is utilized, sentencing judges give the issue of collateral immigration consequences serious consideration in determining a fit sentence.

          R. v. McKenzie, 2017 ONCA, at para 35.

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