Does an Individual have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in his/her Municipal Address?

Section 8 of the Charter guarantees “the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” This right contains internal limits: its scope is limited to circumstances in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Hunter v. Southam, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 159.
The factors that inform the analysis of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy have been grouped under four broad headings:
(1) the subject matter of the alleged search;
(2) the claimant’s interest in the subject matter;
(3) the claimant’s subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and
(4) whether this subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances:
R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, at para. 18.
In the informational context, s.8 of the Charter protects “a biographical core” of personal information that “tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual”.
R. v. Plant, 1993 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at pp. 292, 293.
In assessing whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy it is necessary to look not only at the immediate information sought by the police, but the further information that it ultimately reveals.
Spencer, at para 31.
A physical address does not, of itself, reveal intimate details about one’s personal choices or way of life, and, ordinarily, it is publicly available information to which many people have access.
R. v. Saciragic, 2017 ONCA 91, at para 32
An individual residing in a multi-unit dwelling with common areas and video surveillance does not typically possess a reasonable expectation that his comings and goings will not be observed by others or recorded digitally, or that these observations will not be divulged to police.
R. v. Saciragic, 2017 ONCA 91, at para 33
See however R. v. White, [2015] O.J. No. 3563, 2015 ONCA 508 (CanLII), at para 52: a resident has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of his/her condominium building.

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