The Admissions Exception to the Hearsay Rule


Admissions, which in the broad sense refer to any statement made by a declarant and tendered as evidence at trial by the opposing party, are admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay:

R. v. Foreman (2002), 2002 CanLII 6305 (ON CA), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 489, 62 O.R. (3d) 204 (C.A.), citing J. Sopinka, S. Lederman and A. Bryan, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1999), at p. 291.

The admissibility of an admission rests on the theory of the adversary system that what a party has previously stated can be admitted against the party in whose mouth it does not lie to complain of the unreliability of his or her own statements. 

As set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC): 

(a)  The admissions exception to the hearsay rule does not depend on a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness;

(b)  The judge must first be satisfied that there is some evidence that the declarant was the Accused;

(c)  The trier of fact must then determine, on the evidence properly admitted, that the Crown has established on a balance of probabilities, that the Accused was the declarant;

(d)  Once so satisfied, the trier of fact may then consider the admission together with the rest of the evidence, in deciding with the Crown has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt.


Admissions may Take Various Forms

 “Admissions may be made orally, in writing, or by conduct by or on behalf of D. They need not be against D's interest when made. It is left to P to determine whether they will be tendered in evidence. D need not have personal knowledge of the fact(s) admitted, provided s/he exhibits a belief in the truth of the information conveyed. Admissions are evidence both for and against their maker, D, who is entitled to offer explanation(s) for having made them.”

Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence 2006, at pp. 327-328.


A Recent Example

In R. v Bryan, 2017 ONSC 2267 (CanLII), the Declaration of Guarantor portion of a passport application completed by the accused was held to constitute an admission that the accused signed the application as guarantor and an admission that he wrote that he had known the applicant for a certain number of years.  These statements were held to be admissible under the admissions doctrine as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Admissible, but not Necessarily True

The fact a statement is admissible for its truth under the admission exception to the hearsay rule does not mean it is true. Ultimate reliability, or weight, is entirely within the trial judge’s discretion. A judge need not accept hearsay evidence merely because it is admissible and has not been directly contradicted.

Mallet v. Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 2002 ABCA 297 (CanLII), at para. 50.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Warrantless Drug Searches (Section 11(7) of the CDSA)

Were there exigent circumstances? Did the exigent circumstances render it impracticable to obtain a warrant? Section 11(7)   of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act states: (7) A peace officer may exercise any of the powers described in subsection (1), (5) or (6) without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain one. Subsection (1)   of s. 11 empowers a peace officer to conduct a warranted search of a place for, inter alia , a controlled substance and to seize it. Section 11(7), therefore, empowers a peace officer to conduct a warrantless search for a controlled substance, so long as conditions for obtaining a warrant existed and exigent circumstances made it impracticable for the officer to obtain a warrant. For a warrantless entry into a residence to satisfy section 11(7) , the Crown must show that the entry was compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to prese
Read more

Night time Execution of a Search Warrant

Warrants Authorized under the Criminal Code The Criminal Code requires that if a warrant is to be executed at night (after 9:00 p.m., see Criminal Code , s. 2), the night time execution must be justified under the terms of s. 488 of the Criminal Code .    Section 488 of the Criminal Code is not made applicable to warrants and telewarrants issued under the authority of section 11 of the CDSA, which may be executed “at any time”.  R. v. Shivrattan, 2017 ONCA 23; R. v. Saunders , 2003 NLCA 63, 181 C.C.C. (3d) 268, at paras. 27, 31-32, affirmed on other grounds, 2004 SCC 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 505; R. v. Dueck , 2005 BCCA 448, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 378, at paras. 17-21; and R. v. Newell , [2007] O.J. No. 2348, at para. 47 (Ont. S.C.). Warrants Authorized under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act Unlike warrants issued under the Criminal Code , there is no statutory presumption that warrants issued under s. 11 of the CDSA are to be executed before 9:00 p.m. unless night t
Read more

Arrested at Home: Feeney Warrants

At common law, where the police had reasonable grounds to arrest a suspect and reasonable grounds to believe a suspect was in a private dwelling-house, they were entitled to enter and arrest the suspect, with or without an arrest warrant, if proper announcement was made. See R. v. Landry , 1986 CanLII 48 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 145 , and Eccles v. Bourque et al. , 1974 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739 ). However, in the 1997 decision of R. v. Feeney , the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the common law violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that generally, warrantless arrests within private dwellings were prohibited.  Absent exigent circumstances or cases of hot pursuit, an entry warrant would be required to enter a dwelling house to make an arrest.    R. v. Feeney , 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), at paras. 44-51.  Parliament responded by enacting sections 529-529.5 of the Criminal Code , which, among other things, creates two distinct authorizatio
Read more