The Documents in Possession Rule

The documents in possession rule provides that the contents of a document found in the accused’s possession may be used as circumstantial evidence of the accused’s involvement in the transaction to which the documents relate.
R. v. Black, 2014 BCCA 192 (CanLII) at para. 38.
In R. v. Turlon (1989), 49 C.C.C. (3d) 186 (Ont. C.A.) at 190, the Ontario Court of Appeal discussed the roots of the rule, citing Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed. (1982) para. 21−09:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them. [Emphasis in original.]
In Caccamo v. The Queen, 1975 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 786, for instance, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a document found in a kitchen cupboard containing what was described as a mafia “constitution” was admissible as evidence connecting the accused with the criminal organization and thus of the accused’s purpose in possessing a weapon “dangerous to the public peace”.
In summary, documents found in possession of the accused are admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of proving the accused’s knowledge of, or connection with, the transactions or matters to which the documents relate—the documents in possession rule.
Furthermore, where there is evidence that the documents were acted on or adopted by the accused, they are admissible for the truth of their contents, as an exception to the hearsay rule.


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