Sentencing: The Failure of the Trial Judge to Consider the Personal Circumstances of the Offender

An error in principle, the failure to consider a relevant factor or the erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor will justify appellate intervention only where it appears from the trial judge’s decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence.

R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 44

For a recent application of this rule, see R. v. A.G., 2017 ONCA 474, where although the sentencing judge had erred in principle by treating the accused’s absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, the sentence was upheld on appeal.

The fitness of a sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime and its consequences, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

R. v. Lacasse.

The personal circumstances of the accused may inform the question of moral blameworthiness.

R. v. Davies, 2017 ONCA 467, at para. 5

In R. v. Davies, Ibid., the trial judge committed an error in principle by sentencing the accused without obtaining or considering information about his personal circumstances (which included being taken into child protection as a young child, and being the victim of abuse).  This error impacted the sentence imposed; the Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced that sentence accordingly.

Stuart O'Connell, O'Connell Law Group (leadersinlaw.ca).